High-ranking officials of the federal economic ministries of Russia: the main recruitment channels and careers
Research Article
How to Cite
Tev D.B. High-ranking officials of the federal economic ministries of Russia: the main recruitment channels and careers. Vlast i Elity (Power and Elites). 2022. Vol. 9. No. 1. P. 56–93. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31119/pe.2022.9.1.3 (in Russ.).
Abstract
The article analyzes the recruitment channels and careers of highranking officials of the economic ministries of the Russian government. The empirical basis of the study was a biographical database of 225 deputy ministers and department directors of eight ministries. The study showed that bureaucratic professionalization is the most pronounced characteristic of the their career. The main channel of recruitment is the federal administration, and the overwhelming majority have already worked in their ministry before entering current position. These trends are likely to indicate the importance of competency-based meritocratic selection. At the same time, classical bureaucrats with a purely administrative career, especially in one ministry, are a clear minority. Interdepartmental mobility is present, and the most common are mixed careers, when administrative experience is combined with non-bureaucratic employment. The most important, albeit mostly indirect, source of external recruitment of officials is commercial organizations, and the role of large state-owned companies from the sectors supervised by ministries is especially significant. Business experience is found more often, and direct intradepartmental recruitment is less common at the highest level of the administrative hierarchy. Differences between ministries are also noticeable. Ministries with the most bureaucratic careers and a particularly important role of intradepartmental experience and ministries with the most pronounced plutocratic recruitment are singled out. Finally, in a number of ministries, there is a noticeable overlap between ministers and their subordinates in a career preceding the current position, which may indicate the importance of patrimonial recruitment of officials based on personal loyalty, patron-client relationships.
Keywords:
ministries, officials, recruitment channels, career, administration, business
References
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2. Gimpel’son V.E., Magun V.S. Na sluzhbe gosudarstva rossijskogo: perspektivy i ogranichenija kar’ery molodyh chinovnikov [In the service of the Russian state: prospects and limitations of the career of young officials]. Vestnik obshhestvennogo mnenija. Dannye. Analiz. Diskussii [Bulletin of Public Opinion. Data. Analysis. Discussions], 2004, 5 (73), pp. 19–36. (In Russian).
3. Kadrovaja politika na gossluzhbe: tekushhie problemy i neobhodimye izmenenija [Personnel policy in the civil service: current problems and necessary changes]. Ed. by Shkljaruk M. Moscow: Schetnaja palata Rossijskoj Federacii, Centr perspektivnyh upravlencheskih reshenij, 2021. 118 p. (In Russian).
4. Kryshtanovskaya О. Osnovnye trendy formirovanija upravlencheskoj jelity Rossii 2020–2030 gg. [The Key Trends in Forming the Governance Elite in Russia in 2020–2030]. Vestnik Rossijskogo fonda fundamental’nyh issledovanij. Gumanitarnye i obshhestvennye nauki. [Russian Foundation for Basic Research Journal. Humanities and social sciences], 2020, 5 (102), pp. 117–134. https://doi.org/10.22204/2587-89562020-102-05-117-134. (In Russian).
5. Tev D. Federal’naja administrativnaja jelita Rossii: kar’ernye puti i kanaly rekrutirovanija [Federal Administrative Elite of Russia: Career Paths and Channels of Recruitment]. Polis. Politicheskie issledovanija [Polis: Political Studies], 2016, 4, pp. 115–130. https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2016.04.10. (In Russian).
6. Huntington S. Politicheskij porjadok v menjajushhihsja obshhestvah [Political order in changing societies]. Moscow: Progress-Tradicija, 2004. 480 p. (In Russian).
7. Aberbach J.D., Putnam R.D., Rockman B.A. Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies. Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: Harvard University Press, 1981. 322 р.
8. Brown Jr. J.R. The Ministry of Finance: Bureaucratic Practices and the Transformation of the Japanese Economy. Westport; Connecticut; London: Quorum Books, 1999. 288 р.
9. Cassese S. Italy’s Senior Civil Service: An Ossified World // Bureaucratic Elites in Western European States. A Comparative Analysis of Top Officials / ed. by E.C. Page, V. Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. P. 55–64.
10. Cho W., Im T., Porumbescu G.A., Lee H., Park J. A Cross-Country Study of the Relationship between Weberian Bureaucracy and Government Performance // International Review of Public Administration. 2013. Vol. 18, no. 3. P. 115–137. https://doi.org/10.1080/12294659.2013.10805266.
11. Cornell A., Knutsen C.H., Teorell J. Bureaucracy and Growth // Comparative Political Studies. 2020. Vol. 53, no. 14. P. 2246–2282. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020912262.
12. Derlien Y-U. Repercussions of Government Change on the Career Civil Service in West Germany: The Cases of 1969 and 1982 // Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration. 1988. Vol. 1, № 1. P. 50–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.1988.tb00059.x.
13. Derlien H-U. Mandarins or Managers? The Bureaucratic Elite in Bonn, 1970 to 1987 and Beyond // Governance: an International Journal of Policy and Administration. 2003. Vol. 6, no. 3. P. 401–428. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0491.00222.
14. Edinger L., Searing D. Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry // American Political Science Review. 1967. Vol. 61, no. 2. P. 428–445. https://doi.org/10.2307/1953255.
15. Etzion D., Davis G.F. Revolving Doors? A Network Analysis of Corporate Officers and U.S. Government Officials // Journal of Management Inquiry. 2008. Vol. 17, no. 3. P. 157–161. https://doi.org/10.1177/1056492608316918.
16. Evans P., Rauch J.E. Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries // Journal of Public Economics. 2000. Vol. 75, no. 1. P. 49–71. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00044-4.
17. Evans P., Rauch J.E. Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of “Weberian” State Structures on Economic Growth // American Sociological Review. 1999. Vol. 64, no. 5. P. 748–765. https://doi.org/10.2307/2657374.
18. Faccio M. Differences between Politically Connected and Nonconnected Firms: A Cross-Country Analysis // Financial Management. 2010. Vol. 39, no. 3. P. 905–928. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-053X.2010.01099.x.
19. Fortescue S. Russia’s civil service: professional or patrimonial? Executive-level officials in five federal ministries // Post-Soviet Affairs. 2020. Vol. 36, no. 4. P. 365–388. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2020.1757314.
20. Goetz K.H. The development and current features of the German civil service system // Civil Service Systems in Western Europe, Second Edition / ed. by F.M. Van der Meer. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011. P. 37–65.
21. Greer S.L., Jarman H. The British civil service system // Civil Service Systems in Western Europe, Second Edition / ed. by F.M. Van der Meer. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011. P. 13–35.
22. Grigoriev I., Zhirkov K. Do political connections make businesspeople richer? Evidence from Russia, 2003–2010 // Research and Politics. 2020. Vol. 7, no. 4. P. 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168020979434.
23. Harris J.S., Garcia T.V. The Permanent Secretaries: Britain’s Top Administrators // Public Administration Review. 1966. Vol. 26, no. 1. P. 31–44. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.1989.tb00718.x.
24. Huskey E. The Politics-Administration Nexus in Post-communist Russia // Russian Bureaucracy and the State: Officialdom From Alexander III to Vladimir Putin / ed. by D.K. Rowney, E. Huskey. Basingstoke; Hants; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. P. 253–272.
25. Huskey E. Elite recruitment and state-society relations in technocratic authoritarian regimes: The Russian case // Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 2010. Vol. 43, no. 4. P. 363–372. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2010.10.004.
26. Koh B.C. Stability and Change in Japan’s Higher Civil Service // Comparative Politics. 1979. Vol. 11, no. 3. P. 279–297. https://doi.org/10.2307/421823.
27. Kubota A. Higher Civil Servants in Postwar Japan. Their Social Origins, Educational Backgrounds, and Career Patterns. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. 214 р.
28. Lewanski R., Toth F. The Italian civil service system // Civil Service Systems in Western Europe, Second Edition / ed. by F.M. Van der Meer. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011. P. 217–241.
29. Mann D.E. The Selection of Federal Political Executives // The American Political Science Review. 1964. Vol. 58, no. 1. P. 81–99. https://doi.org/10.2307/1952757.
30. Mann D.E., Smith Z.A. The Selection of U.S. Cabinet Officers and Other Political Executives // International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique. 1981. Vol. 2, no. 2. P. 211–234. https://doi.org/10.1177/019251218100200206.
31. Martin J.M. An Examination of Executive Branch Appointments in the Reagan Administration by Background and Gender // Western Political Quarterly. 1991. Vol. 44, no. 1. P. 173–184. https://doi.org/10.2307/448753.
32. Ogushi A. Russian Bureaucratic Elites: Patrimonial or Technocratic? Paper presented to ICCEES VIII World Congress, July 27, Stockholm, 2010. URL: http://euro.sutyajnik.ru/documents/3127.pdf (дата обращения: 14.12.2022).
33. Schmidt C. Japan’s Circle of Power: Legitimacy and Integration of a National Elite // ASIEN — The German Journal on Contemporary Asia. 2005. Vol. 96. P. 46–67.
34. Shevchenko I. Easy Come, Easy Go: Ministerial Turnover in Russia, 1990–2004 // Europe-Asia Studies. 2005. Vol. 57, no. 3. P. 399–428. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130500073373.
35. Talbot C. The British Administrative Elite. The Art of Change without Changing? // Revue française d’administration publique. 2014, no. 151–152. P. 741– 761. https://doi.org/10.3917/rfap.151.0741.
36. Theakston K, Fry G.K. Britain’s Administrative Elite: Permanent Secretaries 1900–1986 // Public Administration. 1989. Vol. 67, no. 2. P 129–147. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.1989.tb00718.x.
37. Van Thiel S., Steijn B., Allix M. ‘New Public Managers’ in Europe: Changes and Trends // New Public Management in Europe: Adaptation and Alternatives / ed. by C. Pollitt, S. Van Thiel, V. Homburg. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. P. 90– 106.
38. Wirsching E. The revolving door for political elites: policymakers’ professional background and financial regulation. Working Paper no. 222. Prepared in November 2018. URL: https://www.ebrd.com/publications/working-papers/revolving-door (дата обращения: 07.08.2021).
Article
Received: 08.06.2022
Accepted: 16.08.2022
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[1]
Tev, D.B. 2022. High-ranking officials of the federal economic ministries of Russia: the main recruitment channels and careers. Vlast i Elity (Power and Elites). 9, 1 (Aug. 2022), 56–93. DOI:https://doi.org/10.31119/pe.2022.9.1.3.
Section
Elites in the Economic Space
